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THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHIATRIST AND PSYCHIATRIC
TESTIMONY IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS
John J. Broderick*
Introduction
In this article an evaluation of the role of the psychiatrist as an expert
witness will be made as well as an examination of the functions of the psychiatrist
and psychiatry in the pre- and post-trial phases. Finally, recommendations for
improvement will be discussed.
Just recently Nathan Leopold, Jr., was released from a state penitentiary
where he had spent the past thirty-three years of his life for the "thrill slaying"
of fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks. Leopold and Loeb both entered pleas of
guilty. In the trial which began on July 23, 1924, in the Criminal Court of
Cook County, Illinois, psychiatry played a very prominent part. Clarence
Darrow, the defense counsel, relied heavily upon the testimony of psychiatrists
to establish the mental condition of the defendants in order to avoid the death
sentence and have them committed to a penitentiary. This case is of interest
because the court was presented with an opportunity "to determine the mental
condition of persons accused of crime, according to the dictates of science and
modem psychiatry, without arbitrary and unscientific limitations imposed by
archaic rules of law."'
In recent decades psychiatry has grown in importance and the psychiatrist
is being called upon more and more, by both parties, to testify upon issues in
cases involving crimes and wills.' Many problems have arisen regarding the
acceptance of such testimony and the weight to be given to it.
As Dr. Roche has suggested, both the lawyer and the psychiatrist must
re-examine the premises upon which they base their concepts of mental illness
and the subject element of crime.'
[The] conflict cannot be resolved until the lawyer and the
psychiatrist join in an acceptance that the "real world" is un-
consciously shaped and colored by our language habits which pre-
dispose certain interpretations; that the verbal world of abstraction
is illusory and detached from the facts of life. Furthermore, as
long as traditional criminal justice continues as an autonomous
system of supernatural concepts, which cannot be defined in terms
of experience, the positive sciences will continue outside of its
operations and the relations of criminal law and psychiatry will
remain tensional.4
With this in mind, the problem areas, the reasons they have arisen or exist
and the possible solutions will now be discussed.
* B.A., M.P.A., LL.B., Assistant Dean, Notre Dame Law School.
1 MCKERNAN, THE AMAZING CRIME AND TRIAL OF LEOPOLD AND LOEB vii (1957).
2 GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 10, 11 (1952).
3 ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND iX (1958).
4 Id. at x.
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The Problems Stated
Psychiatry is that branch of medical science which deals with the diagnosis
and treatment of mental disorders.' A psychiatrist is defined by Webster as,
"a specialist in psychiatry, an alienist."'
The general rule is that any doctor by reason of his education and training
is presumed competent to advise the trier of fact. He need not be a specialist
in any particular branch of his profession nor have any experience of his own on
the particular question involved in the case.'
As McCormick points out:
An observer is qualified to testify because he has first hand knowl-
edge which the jury does not have of the situation or transaction
at issue. The expert has something different to contribute. This
is the power to draw inferences from the facts which a jury would
not be competent to draw. To warrant the use of expert testimony,
then, two elements are required. First, the subject of the inference
must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business
or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman, and
second, the witness must have such skill, knowledge, or experience
in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or
inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth. The
knowledge may in some fields be derived from reading alone, in
some from practice alone, or as is more commonly the case, from
both."
To properly determine the role of the psychiatrist as an expert witness it
is necessary to examine the views of the legal writers and the courts.
McCormick states that the use of psychiatric testimony in cases involving
mental disorders and defects suggests itself as a potential aid in determining the
credibility of key witnesses in any kind of litigation.9 In one type of case, namely
that of sex offenses, there seems to be general agreement among the text writers
that this type of testimony is indispensable."0 However, as shall be seen, the
courts appear to be more hesitant in accepting such testimony. Wigmore is in
favor of psychological diagnosis of testimony by all recognized modem methods.1
The use of psychiatric testimony on the issue of credibility of a witness was
vividly demonstrated in the Alger Hiss trial when the judge held that the
admission of psychiatric testimony was admissible to impeach the credibility of
the government's witness, Whittaker Chambers.", The outcome of this trial
was dependent to a large extent upon the testimony of one man - Whittaker
Chambers. Mr. Chambers' credibility was one of the major issues upon which
the jury had to pass since the opinion of the jury is the decisive authority on
this question. Dr. Binger, a psychiatrist as a witness for the defendant, was per-
5 GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, supra note 2 at 5.
6 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2001 (2d ed. 1955).
7 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCF, § 13 (1954); TRACY, THE DOCTOR AS A WITNESS 36 (1957).
8 McCoRmICx, op. cit. supra, note 7.
9 Ibid.
10 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 924a, 934a, 963 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 45(1954); Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1951).
11 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 997-999 (3d ed. 1940); Redmount, The Psychological Bases
of Evidence Practices: Intelligence, 42 MINN. L. REv. 559 (1958).
12 U. S. v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFErN, supra
note 2, ch. 15.
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mitted, over objection, to testify that Chambers, Hiss' accuser, was a psycho-
pathic personality with a "tendency toward making false accusations."' 3  The
court stated:
The existence of insanity or mental derangement is admissible for
the purpose of discrediting a witness. Evidence of insanity is not
merely for the judge on the preliminary question of competency,
but goes to the jury to affect credibility [citations]. Since the use
of psychiatric testimony to impeach the credibility of a witness is
a comparatively modem innovation, there appear to be no federal
cases dealing with this precise question. However, the importance
of insanity on the question of credibility is often stressed. There
are some State cases in which such testimony' has been held to be
admissible or which indicate that if this question had been pre-
sented, it would have been admissible."
The judge further stated that he had given full consideration to the govern-
ment's argument against the admission of this testimony. However evidence
concerning the credibility was relevant and material; under the circumstances
in the case, and in view of the foundations laid, it was received, but in his
charge to the jury he advised them of the weight which may be given to such
testimony. 5
The fact that Alger Hiss was convicted indicates that the testimony of the
psychiatrist is not controlling upon the jury but will be weighed along with
other evidence presented.
There are state court cases in which psychiatric testimony was admitted
to impeach the credibility of a witness. For example, in People v. Cowles,6
the defendant, who was charged with statutory rape, called two medical
practitioners, who had observed the girl, and in answer to hypothetical ques-
tions they expressed opinions that she was a pathological falsifier, a nympho-
maniac, and a sexual pervert. The court held that the testimony should have
been received for its bearing upon the question of the weight to be accorded
the testimony of the girl and the question of whether the mind of the girl was
so warped by sexual contemplation and desires as to lead her to accept the
imagined as real, or to fabricate a claimed sexual experience.
Here we have the court admitting the testimony of two medical practition-
ers as to the credibility to be accorded the testimony of the girl upon whom the
act was allegedly perpetrated.
The court in State v. Wesler" was in full accord with the holding in the
Cowles case. The court allowed the testimony of two psychiatrists that the
girls, with whom indecent liberties were allegedly taken, were psychopaths and
immoral and that psychopaths are prone to be untruthful, but the court held
that this did not require the jury to reject the girls' stories.
13 Ibid. In the first Hiss trial, Dr. Binger was not allowed to testify. N.Y. Times, July 1,
1949, p. 1, col. 2. In People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill. 2d 60, 142 NE.2d 11, 17 (1957), the
court referred to a psychiatrist witness' definition of psychopathic personality as a "waste
basket" classification.
14 U.S. v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1337-39 (1951);
30 NEBR. L. R. 513-520 (1951); see also CURRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 575-582 (1960).
15 Ibid
16 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929).
17 137 N.J.L. 311, 59 A.2d 834 (1948).
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In Miller v. State,8 the testimony of a doctor who was superintendent of
a hospital for the insane that the girl, said to be a nymphomaniac, was normal,
was held to be admissible as to credibility and was for the jury to weigh.
In the case of Rice v. State,"9 the defendant was convicted of taking indecent
liberties with a twelve-year-old girl. The court set aside the conviction, relying
on the testimony of a doctor that the girl "had a mental condition calculated
to induce unreal and phantom pictures in her mind." The girl's testimony was
wholly uncorroborated, and the court held its truth to be highly improbable
and against the experience of mankind.
The preceding cases illustrate that the testimony of a psychiatrist is normally
admitted, but only to affect credibility. This testimony is not conclusive on the
jury, and it is weighed along with any other evidence which may be presented.
In addition, leading authorities on the law of evidence advocate the
admission of testimony of this character. McCormick points out that:
There is a special danger of sympathy swaying judgment on
credibility in sex cases, but the need exists for appraising the
testimony with all the resources of psychiatric science in every case
where there is ground for believing that a witness on whom the
issue depends is subject to some mental abnormality which might
significantly affect his credibility.20
Dean Wigmore has long advocated the use of psychiatric examination and
testimony in cases in which a woman or young girl has charged a man with a
sexual crime. He expressed the view that the complainant's social history and
mental makeup, especially in sex crimes, has in many cases a direct relation to
veracity. A narration of events that may appear straightforward and convincing
may be the result of multifarious psychic complexes creating an actual belief
in an imaginary story. 2
The psychiatrist also plays a leading role in many will contest cases. The
reason is that, in order to determine whether the testator possessed the required
intent to make a testamentary disposition by will, his mental condition at the
time of making the will is of the utmost importance. The question to be asked
now is: Will the courts allow the psychiatrist to testify as to the testator's mental
condition at the making of the will, and what weight will be given to such
testimony?
The court in one case held that whether a person is suffering from senile
psychosis, or senile dementia, or illness of mind due to senility, is in first instance
a question for the men of the medical profession (psychiatrists in this case) who
have made a special study of nervous and mental diseases, and their evidence
on the question of the effect of such ailments upon the mind and mentality should
be given substantial weight on issue of testamentary incapacity, since insanity
and testamentary incapacity are akin.2"
This case seems to follow the holdings of the previous cases on sex crimes
in which the testimony was admitted but its weight was for the jury. The court
18 49 Old. Cr. 133, 295 (1930).
19 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697 (1928).
20 McCoaaucx, supra note 10 at § 45.
21 3 WiGMORE, supra note 10 at §§ 924a, 931-934, 934a.
22 Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in Probate Proceedings, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 448
(1935).
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stated that substantial weight should be given to the testimony on the issue of
testamentary incapacity, but it was still not conclusive, so as to take the de-
termination from the jury.
The court, in one will contest case in which two psychiatrists who had never
seen the testatrix testified that she was capable of understanding the nature and
consequences of her acts at the time of the execution of the will, commenting
on the weight to be given to this testimony stated:
Whether a person is suffering from senile psychosis, or senile de-
mentia, or illness of mind due to senility, is in the first instance a
question of fact to be determined by men of the medical profession
who have made a special study of nervous and mental diseases;
their evidence on the question of the effect of such ailments upon
the mind and mentality must be given substantial weight. In-
sanity and testamentary incapacity are akin as are sanity and
testamentary capacity, and in this field, the evidence and testimony
of doctors must be given much weight. 23
Again, in Rich's Estate,2 4 it was held that the testimony of a psychiatrist, in
response to a hypothetical question that the testatrix whom he had never known
was insane when she executed a will, was unsatisfactory and insufficient to affect
the validity of the will. It did not establish the fact that the abnormality of
mind which he ascribed to the testatrix had a direct influence on her testa-
mentary act when she executed her holographic will. The court, quoting from
Estate of Dolbeer,2" emphasized that this type of testimony is weak:
The witnesses were skilled alienists, it may be conceded, but the evi-
dence thus adduced of one who has never seen the person, and who
bases his opinion upon the facts given in a hypothetical question, is
evidence the weakest and most unsatisfactory. Such questions them-
selves are always framed with great particularity to meet the views
of the side which presents the expert. They always eliminate from
consideration the countervailing evidence, which may be of a
thousand fold more strength than the evidence upon which the
question is based. They are astutely drawn and drawn for a
purpose and that purpose never is the presentation of all the evi-
dence. It is never to present the fair and accurate view, but the
purpose always is to frame a question such that the answer will
announce a predetermined result. This kind of expert testimony,
given under such circumstances, even the testimony of able and
disinterested witnesses, as no doubt these were, is in the eye of
the law of steadily decreasing value.26
Although the court is highly critical of the utilization of the hypothetical
question, in the above circumstances, underlying tones in the court's decision seem
to indicate that testimony under other circumstances would be viewed more
favorably - particularly in a case where the defendant had been personally
examined by the psychiatrist.
Another problem that presents itself is the use of psychiatric testimony to
show the accused's disposition or propensity. In other words, can a person
accused of a crime use the testimony of psychiatrists as experts to show that his
23 American National Red Cross v. Gumberts, 207 Old. 96, 247 P.2d 735, 739 (1952).
24 79 Cal. App.2d 22, 179 P.2d 373 (1947).
25 149 Cal. 227, 86 Pac. 697 (1906).
26 Rich's Estate 79 Cal. App.2d 22, 179 P.2d 373, 379 (1947).
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mental makeup and personality is such that he would not have the propensity
to the acts involved in the crime charged?
One of the prime examples of the law's avoidance of any true psychological
understanding of the defendants who came before the courts stems from the
orthodox rule of character evidence, which makes "character" and "reputation"
synonymous. As almost universally applied, it allows proof of the defendant's
character only by evidence of his general reputation in his community and
evidence of the individual opinion of the witness of the actual personality of the
defendant is excluded."
The United States Supreme Court, elaborating on this rule, stated:
When the defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry, another
anomalous rule comes into play. Not only is he permitted to call
witnesses to testify from hearsay, but indeed such a witness is not
allowed to base his testimony on anything but hearsay. What
commonly is called "character evidence" is only such when "char-
acter" is employed as a synonym for reputation. The witness may
not testify about defendant's specific acts or courses of conduct or
his possession of a particular disposition or of benign mental or
moral traits, nor can he testify that his own acquaintance, observa-
tion and knowledge of defendant leads to his own independent
opinion that defendant possesses a good general or specific character
inconsistent with commission of acts charged. The witness is,
however, allowed to summarize what he has heard in the commu-
nity, although much of it may have been said by persons less
qualified to judge than himself. The evidence which the law
permits is not as to the personality of the defendant but only as
to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood. 28
In 1954, the California Supreme Court made a radical departure from the
orthodox rule which limits proof of character to reputation evidence and per-
mitted the defense to submit expert psychiatric opinion evidence of the actual
personality traits of the defendant who was charged with the commission of
lewd and lascivious acts upon the person of his nine-year-old niece. It rested
its decision primarily upon a California statute providing for the psychiatric
examination of persons convicted of a sex offense involving a child below the
age of 14. These proceedings, subsequent to convictions, were authorized in
order to determine whether the offender was a sexual psychopath. The court
held that the testimony was admissible as evidence of good character showing the
defendant's disinclination to this type of crime. Furthermore, the psychiatrist
was permitted to testify although his opinions were based in part on a narco-
analysis interview with the defendant.29
As Professor Curran has pointed out,"0 the Supreme Court of California
refused to follow People v. Sellers,"' a district court of appeal case, decided in
27 WIGMORE, supra, note 10 at §§ 1980, 1981, 1983; Curran, Expert Psychiatric Evidence
of Personality Traits, 103 U. PA. L. R. 999 (1955) ; Falknor and Steffen, Evidence of Character:
From the "Crucible of the Community" to the Couch of the Psychiatrist, 102 U. PA. L.R. 980
(1954); ZrLBOURG, THE PsYcHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 14 (1954).
28 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948).
29 People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954); Curran, supra note 27; Falknor
and Steffen, supra note 27.
30 Curran, supra note 27, at 1002.
31 103 Cal. App. 2d 830, 230 P.2d 398 (1951).
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1951. In that case, the defendant was charged with a crime of homosexual
perversion. The court refused to admit expert psychiatric testimony by the
defendant that he was not a homosexual, stating:
The law does not make a distinction as to the type of person who
may commit the act charged. It is a punishable offense whether
the person is normal or abnormal. The proffered evidence is not
• . .a type of circumstantial evidence admissible for the purpose
of proving the performance or non-performance of a criminal act.3 2
The reason that the court in the Jones case refused to follow the Sellers case
was that:
The reasoning of that case overlooks the accepted fact that homo-
sexual acts of the nature there considered constitute abnormal
conduct indulged in by persons with a propensity for it; normal
individuals do not resort to such acts, hence a showing of sexual
normality in that respect has relevancy to the non-performance
of homosexual acts.33
Thus, two different California courts reached opposite conclusions on the
question - one court permitted the psychiatrist to testify as to a defendant's
mental make-up, the other court refused to do so. Professors Falknor and Steffen
disagree with the Jones decision, on the ground, that, "if expert opinion is to be
received that defendant is not a 'sexual deviate' or a 'homosexual,' on what prin-
ciple may there be excluded psychiatric opinion that he is not a 'thief,' a 'robber'
or a 'murderer.' "" Professor Curran on the other hand agrees with it and feels
it is significant not only in challenging one "orthodox doctrine" but also as
evidence of the dynamic growth of one legal system in the area of proof. In
his opinion,
if the courts became convinced that definite personality traits, such
as those generally recognized in sex deviates and homosexuals, are
developed and classified by medical science in regard to other types
of crimes, then such evidence should be admitted. . . .Here we
are leaving the door open in the courtroom for advances in medical
science to show us the means of bringing our system closer to reality
and truth.35
In State v. Sinnot,36 the defendant was convicted of sodomy with a male
child under the age of 16 years. New Jersey has a statute similar to the Cali-
fornia statute in the Jones case. There the New Jersey Supreme Court refused
to permit a psychiatrist, who had given the defendant a neuropsychiatric ex-
amination and an examination after sodium pentothal had been administered,
to testify that defendant's mind was normal and his disposition benign, at least
in so far as sex offenses were concerned, since such testimony was more or less
equivalent to evidence of good character. The court said:
32 Id. at 399.
33 People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
34 Falknor and Steffen, supra note 27, at 990.
35 Curran, supra note 27, at 1013; People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952),
where in a prosecution for first-degree murder the accused's mental ability for premeditation
was in issue, doctor who expressed that accused did not have such ability was properly prevented
from testifying as to test of defendant made while defendant was under the influence of sodium
amytal.
36 43 N.J. Super. 1, 127 A.2d 424, (App. Div. 1956), aff'd, 24 N.J. 408, 132 A.2d 298
(1957).
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Moreover, if we admit testimony as to the trait or susceptibilities
in sex cases, there would seem to be no logical reason for excluding
it from other criminal prosecutions."
The court pointed out that the ability of psychiatry to determine the propensities,
or the lack thereof, to commit a sodomous act, is still in a state of refinement
and that historically, it has not been "disadvantageous for the courts to lag
a little.
' 38
It is interesting to note that psychiatry recognizes the difficulty in ascertain-
ing whether one is a homosexual since "the homosexual is not typically mentally
ill, nor are the mentally ill typically homosexual."39
Another view of homosexuality is that its origin is never environmental or
acquired but always constitutional or biological.4 The homosexual is not a
psychopathic personality but is often so classified; one of the reasons being that
in the minds of some physicians any sexual deviation is unequivocally associated
with antisocial behavior.4
A statistical analysis4 of 250 sex offenders examined at the New Jersey
Diagnostic Center reached the following results: of 33 homosexual acts com-
mitted there were 24 child victims;43 17 of the homosexual offenders were
found to be under the Act44 for sex offenders, 16 were not.45 The report makes
no psychiatric diagnosis by individual sex offense, but it is surprising to discover
that in total there were more offenders who were considered normal than there
were suffering from serious personality disorders.4 Therefore, lack of deviational
traits would appear to have little bearing on whether one had committed a
specific act which is a sex offense.
Some courts are inclined to admit psychiatric testimony while others express
doubt as to its efficacy. In Boyd v. State,4" the court held that in a murder
prosecution, a psychiatrist's expert testimony that, in his opinion, the defendant
suffered from insane delusions and lacked sufficient mentality to comprehend
the difference between right and wrong as to a crime connected with such delu-
sions was competent evidence on the question of the defendant's mental state,
but not conclusive on the jury. The court said in this case that expert testimony
is intended to aid the jury in arriving at correct conclusion on issue made, but
the jury is not bound by expert opinion and may disregard it or give such
testimony credence or not as the jury sees fit.
The opinion in Boyd is essentially the same as that stated in the case of
Fitzhugh v. State,48 where a mother -was convicted of manslaughter in the first
degree for the killing of her own child. The court held that the opinions of
37 State v. Sinnot, 132 A.2d 298, 310 (1957).
38 172 A.2d 424, 429.
39 COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND NORMAL LIFE 418 (1950).
40 101 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 682 (1945).
41 Id. at 686.
42 FRANKEL, PSYCHIATRIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SEX OFFENDERS (1950); PLOScoWE, SEx
AND THE LAw ch. VII (1951).
43 Id. at 3.
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 164-3 (West 1954).
45 FRANKEL, supra note 42 at 9.
46 Id. at 4.
47- 207 Ga. 567, 63 S.E.2d 394 (1951).
48 35 Ala. 18, 43 So. 2d 831 (1949).
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experts in the field of mental disorders as to the accused's sanity are admissible
in a criminal prosecution but such opinion evidence is not conclusive on the
jury. The report of the psychiatric examination of three mental specialists was
admitted in evidence.
The view of a federal court is seen in United States v. Gundelfinger,49
where the court said that the principal function of a psychiatrist who testifies on
mental state of an abnormal offender is to inform the jury of the character of
his mental disease, and psychiatrist's moral judgment reached on basis of his
observations is relevant, but it cannot bind jury, on issue of criminal responsi-
bility, except within broad limits. This federal court decision doesn't make any
changes in the usual ruling on this point by the courts which permit such
testimony.
The court in the case of State v. Putzel 50 looked upon the use of the
hypothetical question with a critical eye as the courts did in the sex violation
cases and the cases concerning the contest of wills. In a prosecution for first-
degree murder, in this Washington case, the court held that the question as to
the sanity of the defendant at the time of the homicide, upon all of the evidence
and the law as given by the court was the responsibility of the jury, and it was
not bound by the doctor's conclusions given in answer to hypothetical questions
relating to sanity. All of the doctors who testified were specialists in the field
of psychiatry.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Patskin,"1 ex-
pressed some doubt as to the efficacy of expert psychiatric testimony. In a pro-
ceeding for the commitment of Patskin to a mental hospital, after a conviction
for first degree murder, the court referred to its opinion affirming Patskin's
conviction as follows:
... The defendant's actions, statements and confessions - even
without the corroborating testimony of the Commonwealth's expert
witnesses and lay witnesses - wholly refute the opinion evidence
of defendant's expert medical witnesses.52
In a footnote in the commitment proceedings, the court said:
The profession and prestige of psychiatry has been gravely damaged
by the testimony of some of its experts on the subject of insanity
in homicide cases, as a result of which considerable doubt of the
soundness or dependability of their conclusions has been raised in
the minds of the courts and juries alike. While the science of
psychiatry has made tremendous strides, the Courts of Pennsyl-
vania have at this stage of scientific knowledge refused, and we
believe wisely refused, to substitute psychiatric tests or conclusions
for our long and wisely established "right and wrong" test.53
It is interesting to note that both the Model Code of Evidence54 and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence55 allow opinion evidence as to the personality traits
49 102 F. Supp. 177 (D.C. Pa. 1952).
50 40 Wash. 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952); OVERHOLSER, Ti- PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW
112-14 (1953).
51 375 Pa. 368, 100 A.2d 472 (1953).
52 Commonwealth v. Patskin, 372 Pa. 402, 93 A.2d 704, 714 (1953).
53 Id. at 473.
54 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, RULE 306 (1942).
55 UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE 46, 47 (1953).
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of an individual. Thus, there exists a battleground of opposing views within
the courts and among legal writers on the question of the admissibility and
worth of psychiatric testimony.
It appears that courts and legal writers are suspicious and distrustful of
psychiatric testimony. Thus, it may be helpful to peruse the views of the psychia-
trists, who are well aware of legal distrust of their field, in order to determine
why these difficulties exist and how they may be alleviated.
Dr. Zilbourg points out that one of the roots of the perennial conflict
between psychiatry and the law arises from the fact that the officers 'of the law
avoid any semblance of identification with a criminal or an "insane" person
because they feel that such identification might weaken their purely legal judg-
ment. They scrupulously protect themselves against any tendency they might
discover within themselves to put themselves psychologically in the defendant's
place. On the other hand, the psychiatrist is in an entirely different psychological
position since his job is to delve into the deeper motives and the inner substance
of the act for which the defendant is standing trial. Thus Dr. Zilbourg states:
The law seems to be afraid that psychiatry might understand the
transgressor too well and might forgive too readily. Psychiatry
seems to be afraid that the law actively avoids any true psychological
understanding of the transgressor, because the law's business is to
keep its punitive promises and not wax sentimental by way of
scientific understanding. 57
In his recent book, Dr. MacDonald agrees with Dr. Zilbourg that one
barrier to a more enlightened outlook in the treatment of the criminal is the
lack of understanding between the two professions -law and psychiatry. He
points out that since the judge passing sentence on the offender is concerned
with the rehabilitation of the offender as well as the protection of society, he
should possess some knowledge of psychology and sociology or the willingness
to pay attention to the advice of experts in the fields.5"
Dr. Davidson, in his book on forensic psychiatry, written as a psychiatric
legal guide for physicians, said that the position of the psychiatrist as viewed by
the courts today is as follows:
Usually the psychiatrist comes to court as an expert and is thus
expected to give not only findings and facts but also opinions,
prognoses, conclusions, and evaluations. Whether a particular
doctor is acceptable as an expert depends, in a large degree, on the
discretion of the judge. It is general practice for courts to permit
any physician to testify as an expert if he can establish any reason-
able claim to specialized knowledge, even though his qualifications
might not meet standards of specialists' organizations or boards.
The judge's position is usually this: let the doctor testify - the
jury can appraise the validity and credibility of his testimony them-
selves and compare his testimony and qualifications with those of
other experts.59
56 ZILBouRo, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 13 (1954);
ZILBOURO, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 249 (1943).
57 Id. at 46.
58 MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 194 (1958).
59 DAvDsoN, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 243, 244 (1952); see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 13(1954); TRACY, THE DOCTOR AS A WITNESS 36 (1957).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Professor Green emphasizes that the reputation of psychiatry as a science
has suffered because of its connections with criminal law, and for this reason the
legal profession is suspicious of the psychiatrist. He states that in an important
murder trial, where the defense is insanity, it is more or less common spectacle
for a group of psychiatrists of equal eminence to be lined up on each side of
the case. This creates a tendency in the judicial mind to view their opinions with
suspicion. This suspicion is not removed if such a situation occurs in a civil
case. It is not uncommon for groups of equally prominent psychiatrists to be
lined up on either side of an important will contest. This further tends to
confirm and strengthen the suspicions."
Dr. MacDonald gives a psychiatrist's answer to Professor Green's criticism
when he states:
The legal profession is critical because psychiatrists sometimes
disagree in the witness stand. This is a revealing criticism coming
as it does from persons who are dependent upon disagreement
for their very livelihood. Psychiatry is not an exact science and
there will always be disagreement, especially so long as the
psychiatrist has to express his opinion within the rigid framework
of an artificial and unsatisfactory test of criminal responsibility."'
Another reason why the legal profession is suspicious of psychiatrists is the
failure of the psychiatrists themselves to agree on the meaning of certain terms.
As we have already seen, this was vividly illustrated in the Hiss case, where a
psychiatrist testified that Chambers, the star witness, was a "psychopatic person-
ality."62  Roche states that the most telling objection to such expert testimony
was that there is no agreement among psychiatrists as to what a psychopath
really is. He feels that this lack of agreement makes such impeachment pro-
cedure ineffective and untenable."
Dr. Davidson emphasizes that the language barrier between the lawyer and
the psychiatrist is a serious one in the trial of a case. There is the problem of
translating medical jargon into plain English. 4 A word may have a specialized
meaning in psychiatry but a standard nonmedical dictionary will give a different
definition than that presented by the psychiatrist. The difference between the
general and special meaning may be striking. When the psychiatrist speaks he
means one thing, but the jury and the lawyer hear something else. An example
would be the word "psychopath," which to a juror obviously means "insane";
the psychiatrists who quarrel as to the meaning of the word are generally
agreed on one point, that is, whatever else it may mean, it does not equal
insanity.6 5
At least one court has expressed a fear that acceptance of psychiatric theory
to too great an extent will bring about a breakdown in law enforcement. The
court said:
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Defendant contends that because a criminal or murderer-is a weak,
unstable, aggressive, dangerous moron who is mentally deficient,
the sentencing Judge or Court (1) must consider his record during
his entire life and particularly reports of every psychologist and
psychiatrist who has examined him, and (2) must be controlled by
these reports and impose a sentence in the case of murder in the
first degree not higher than life imprisonment. This contention
carries the theory or doctrine of "diminished responsibility" to an
extreme and would vest in a psychiatrist and not the Courts the
right and power to determine and fix punishment for crimes. Such
a theory or philosophy would soon transfer the punishment of
criminals from Court to psychiatrists and would inevitably result
in a further breakdown of law enforcement and eventual con-
fusion and chaos. Fortunately, our cases are opposed to such
an undesirable result.66
Suggested Solutions to the Problems
The late Justice Stephens was of the opinion that in criminal cases where
insanity was involved, or where, after conviction, the appropriateness of treat-
ment in respect to the criminal rather than the crime is in question, the courts
can learn much from administrative tribunals. He suggested the use of investi-
gators acting for the court, in addition to and not in substitute for similar experts
acting for the parties. 7
In the Patskin case, mentioned above,68 the court cited the Pennsylvania
Mental Health Act, which provides that upon the petition of counsel for
defendant (or district attorney or warden, or any other responsible person) a
Sanity Commission, consisting of a qualified psychiatrist, a physician and an
attorney, shall be appointed by the court to investigate the mental condition of
the person charged with crime and to report thereon. The court, although it
construed this provision of the Act to be discretionary and not mandatory, did
appoint such a commission.
In Massachusetts the Briggs Law provides for a routine mental examination
by the department of mental diseases of persons accused of a capital offense and
persons known to have been indicted for any other offense more than once.
It provides for the filing by the department of a report of its investigation
with the Clerk of the Court in which the trial is to be held, making the
report accessible to the Court, the district attorney and to the attorney for the
accused, and making it admissible as evidence of the mental condition of the
accused.69
Under the Briggs Law and similar statutes, the physician is permitted to
function as a specially trained advisor or consultant, appearing in an im-
partial role. As a result of this statute the "battle of the experts" has practically
disappeared in Massachusetts.
66 Commonwealth v. Elliot, 89 A.2d 782, 785 (1952).
67 Stephens, What Courts Can Learn from Commissions, 19 A.B.A.J. 141, 42 (1933); see
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68 Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368, 100 A.2d 472 (1953).
69 GEN. L. 1920, c. 123 § 100 A, as amended St. 1941, c. 194 § 11; St. 1953 § 17; St.
1957, c. 236; Overholser, The History and Operation of the Briggs Law of Massachusetts, 2
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Dr. Flower decries the fact that the Briggs Law only applies to certain
recidivist offenders and to first offenders indicted for murder. He feels it should
be extended to first offenders indicted for second degree murder, manslaughter,
arson, assault, robbery, and other crimes. However, this may be impossible
because as presently constituted the Briggs Law is cumbersome administratively
and the time interval for examination is not sufficient. Often the examining
physicians are presented with authorizations for four to twelve persons at one
time. It may well be an impossibility to give an adequate examination, com-
plete the case writeups and get the final reports to the court prior to the trial.
Finally, the Briggs Law examinations should be revised and reoriented so that
they would do more than to "state definitely whether, in the opinion of the
examiner, the prisoner is suffering from any mental disease or defect which would
affect his criminal responsibility." They should contribute information useful
to the magistrate in disposition, useful to the probation officers in a planned
program, and useful to a continuing psychotherapy program in a penal institu-
tion.70
Under the laws of New York, 1 a person who is insane is not legally re-
sponsible for the commission of a crime. Even if a person is sane at the time
of the commission of a crime, if he thereafter becomes insane he may neither be
tried, sentenced nor punished. By the provisions of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure,72 if, upon the defendant's arraignment there are reasonable grounds for
believing that defendant is in such a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or in-
sanity, so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making his
defense, the court may order the defendant committed to the custody of the
Director of the Division of Psychiatry of the Department of Hospitals.73 Upon
receipt of the prisoner, the Director of the Division of Psychiatry must promptly
designate two qualified psychiatrists from the staff of such division to make an
examination of the prisoner. Upon completion of the examination, the Director
must transmit to the court forthwith a complete report of the findings of the
qualified psychiatrists who have conducted the examination to the effect that
the defendant is, or is not, at the time of such examination, in such a state of
idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity as to be incapable of understanding the
charge against him in the proceedings or of making his defense. If they find
that the prisoner is in such a state, the report must include a recommendation
as to appropriate institution to which such defendant should be sent. The
report of the psychiatrists made to the court may not be received in evidence
upon the trial of the defendant but is filed by the court in the Office of the
Clerk of Court and is subject to inspection only on an order of that court.7 ,
The court must cause a copy of the report to be served on the prosecutor of the
county where the crime was committed and upon the counsel for the defendant.
If they do not accept the findings of the psychiatrists and wish to controvert
70 Flower, The Psychiatric Examination of Offenders in Massachusetts, in HocH AND
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74 People v. Draper, 104 N.Y.S.2d 703, aff'd 303 N.Y. 653, 101 N.E. 2d 763 (1951).
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them, the court shall afford an opportunity to counsel for defendant and the
district attorney to do so before him. If after the hearing is concluded, the
court is of the opinion that the defendant is in such a state of idiocy, imbecility,
lunacy or insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charge against him,
or the proceedings, or of making his defense, the trial must be suspended until
such time as the defendant is no longer in such a state. The court will then
commit the defendant to a state hospital for the insane of the Department of
Correction or any other appropriate state institution. of the Department of
Mental Hygiene.
A defendant so committed must remain confined in such institution until
he is no longer in such a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy or insanity as to be
incapable of understanding the charge against him or of making his defense
thereto. Upon the occurrence of such an event, the director of the institution
wherein such defendant is confined, must inform the court, the district attorney
and the defendant's counsel of such fact, so that the person so confined may be
forthwith returned to the authority by which he was originally held in confine-
ment. The court must order the sheriff, without delay, to bring such defendant
from such institution and commit him in proper custody; then, the proceedings
against the defendant are to be resumed and the defendant brought to trial, or
his indictment otherwise disposed of.
If the defendant is found not to be presently insane, and the court, after
hearing the qualified psychiatrists and all appropriate parties, approves such
findings, proceedings against the defendant are resumed as if no examination
had been held at all. Present insanity is then barred as an issue before the petit
jury, but this does not preclude the defendant from interposing the defense of
past insanity or insanity at the time of the commission of the crime.
If the defendant, after examination, is found sane he proceeds to trial.
If the judge before final judgment reaches the conclusion, based on his own
observations or on facts called to his attention, that the defendant has become
in such a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity, so as to be incapable of
understanding the proceedings or making his defense, he may suspend the trial
or delay the execution of the judgment and comply with the procedure above
described."
To sum it up, no person can be tried, sentenced, or punished when he is
in such a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity, so as to be incapable of
understanding the proceedings or making his defense.
At the federal level, the importance of a psychiatric examination is recog-
nized by the following provision of the United States Code:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence ...
the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a
person charged with an offense against the United States may be
presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be
unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to
assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial
determination of such mental competency of the accused, setting
forth the ground for such belief with the trial court in which
75 Barshay, supra note 73.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
proceedings are pending. Upon such a motion or upon a similar
motion in behalf of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court
shall cause the accused . . . to be examined as to his mental con-
dition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to
the court.
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These statutory provisions indicate the recognition which is steadily being
given to the field of psychiatry by the legal profession. The defendant is not
only protected during the trial, but also before the trial where his sanity is in
issue. They also act as a good antidote to the distrust created when the defense
hires a psychiatrist to testify regarding the defendant's sanity. The court ap-
pointed psychiatrist cannot be accused of testifying in behalf of the party who is
paying him. On the contrary he is a disinterested and impartial witness and the
jury is in a better position to evaluate his honest opinion without shrugging it
off as of little or no value.
As we have seen, very little weight is given to the hypothetical question and
testimony based on court room observations by the psychiatrist. The psychia-
trist should not testify unless he has been able to give the defendant a thorough
examination. If his testimony is based on a thorough examination it will be
more reliable and more weight will be given to it.
The giving of a thorough examination raises many problems. Frequently,
it may be impractical to provide for the number of interviews necessary to make
a valid determination of mental soundness. Davidson points out that ex-
perienced court examiners reach their diagnosis after a single interview in 90
or 95 percent of the cases, even when they have an opportunity to request
further consultation. 7' The psychiatrist should make as thorough an examination
as time and cost will allow.
The psychiatrist should also give his testimony in terms that the layman
can understand, and when using technical terms he should explain their mean-
ing. This will aid in overcoming the language difficulties between the field of
psychiatry and the law. The jury must be able to understand the testimony
in order to give it any weight. Testimony in understandable terms will save the
psychiatric witness from much ridicule and embarrassment.
In order to remedy the difficulties now existing the psychiatrist must make
a greater effort to understand the law and to prepare himself properly for any
testimony which he may have to give. Books written by psychiatrists and
specialists in the field of mental disorders or forensic psychiatry should be an
invaluable aid to the psychiatrist. The lawyer in turn should make every effort
to learn as much about the field of psychiatry as possible. MacDonald, the
psychiatrist, states in his book that psychiatry and psychology are neglected sub-
jects in the majority of our law schools." It would be a great aid to the attorney
if such courses were included in the law school curriculum. It would help to
make an unfamiliar and hard to understand field more understandable. Until
such steps are taken the gap between psychiatry and the law will close very
slowly. Both fields should do everything possible to hasten the closing of this gap.
76 63 Stat. 686, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1951).
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. There is no doubt that the psychiatrist as an expert witness has much to
offer to the law. The psychiatrist attempts to know the whole man. To know
the whole man he must understand the workings of his mind as well as his
physical being. The psychiatrist is striving to gain such knowledge and the
field of law should not lag behind in its effort to do the same. Our system of
law is founded upon the theory of justice and in order to do justice the law
must know whether the accused is mentally sick; if he is, then curative and
corrective rather than punitive measures should be taken. The Leopold case79
is a prime example of a probing into the mind of the accused. A plea of guilty
to murder was entered, but the judge, upon considering the testimony of
psychiatrists, gave long prison sentences rather than the death sentence which
would normally be imposed for such a crime.
Most courts today would undoubtedly accept the principle that psychiatric
evidence should be received, at least in the judge's discretion, when its value
outweighs the cost in time, distraction, and expense. However, one court has
stated that "while physicians are better qualified to testify to a diseased condition
than a layman, their testimony on the subject of mental capacity of an individual
whom they have been privileged to observe is not entitled to any greater weight
than that of the layman." " The value of such evidence seems to depend upon the
importance of the witness's testimony, and upon the opportunity of the expert to
form a reliable opinion. As the courts have held, an opinion based upon a hypo-
thetical question seems almost valueless here. One psychiatrist calls the hypotheti-
cal question "a logical monstrosity, an artificial and pompous creation of the hu-
man mind, which wishes to get as far away as possible from reality and from the
living human being and talk about both as if they do not exist in fact and decide
what to do with both in fact. I have always considered the hypothetical question
immoral in all its aspects and I have one answer for it... as a psychiatrist I was
taught to look at people and things with the eyes and mind of a trained clinical
psychiatrist. As a doctor, I know nothing of make believe, and I was taught by
the whole history of my specialty to observe facts and people and not supposition
made-to-order and badly made to boot."'"
Only slightly more reliable is an opinion derived from the subject's de-
meanor and his testimony in the courtroom as illustrated by the Hiss case.2 Most
psychiatrists would say that a satisfactory opinion can only be formed after the
accused has been subjected to a clinical examination. It appears that a dis-
cretionary power should be recognized in the judge, upon application before
trial, to order such an examination, subject to the consent of the accused, and
to limit the psychiatric evidence in the other forms to cases where it has not been
feasible to make a clinical examination. In criminal trials a thorough examina-
tion of the accused is of the utmost importance in order to determine whether
the accused had the propensities to commit the crime charged. "
79 McKEIRNAN, supra note 1.
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In addition, it has been suggested that criminals should be classified on the
basis of their psychological propensities and the inner structure of their person-
alities. Neither the law nor the warden is fit to pass on the corrigibility or
incorrigibility of a given criminal..4
Every effort should be made to give the accused the justice due him.
Psychiatric evidence must be allowed in the courts in order for the court to
know the whole man. Admittedly, the field of psychiatry is still in the formative
stages, but it has made great strides during the past decade. Today, the psychia-
trist needs a fuller hearing by the law. He is not permitted to reveal all that he
could reveal about those who commit crimes. Our court procedure must be
radically reformed to permit a more direct presentation of the major psycholo-
gical issues involved in criminal behavior.8 5
Dr. Zilbourg suggests that the psychiatric profession formulate its own
moral code which would govern every psychiatrist in good standing and at
the same time establish definite medical standards which must be met by
potential psychiatrists. In this way, the legal profession and the public
would know which psychiatrists the psychiatrists themselves considered qualified
as specialists in the field of forensic psychiatry. Under this code, a qualified
psychiatric expert would not appear for any one side in a criminal case, but
only as a friend of the court. Furthermore, he would be considered as acting
against the ethical principles of his profession if he accepted the concept of legal
insanity; for clinical psychiatry does not know of such a condition and after
almost two hundred years of clinical investigation seriously doubts its existence.
By accepting those ethical principles the expert would not find it difficult, nor
immoral, nor illegal, to refuse to answer any hypothetical question propounded
to him."
Conclusion
The gap between the legal and psychiatric appraisal of crime has been
narrowing, as has the gap between the legal and psychiatric evaluation of mental
disease itself. While it is true that many issues remain to be solved, the expert
knowledge of the psychiatrist is gradually replacing the early legal views of
mental disorder. 7 Furthermore, as Professor Curran has pointed out:
Methods of proof are the heart of the law in action, in litigation.
Stare decisis has its necessary place in substantive law, but there
should be no vested interests of litigants in the law of evidence.
The courts must seek reality and truth by the best available methods
and certainly cannot ignore scientific findings, analyses, opinions
and methods - and these do not remain static.88
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